The 1654 Pereyaslav Rada: Myths and Realities

III. THE “HOT” FEBRUARY OF 1654

The main lesson that Bohdan Khmelnytsky must have drawn from the Pereyaslav events of the early winter of 1654 was that one should be well prepared not only for war but also for an alliance. For a number of events “revealed serious shortcomings in the performance of the then Ukrainian foreign-policy agency,” as a present-day bureaucrat might say, such as the oath-taking by the tsar’s boyar and other envoys. A host of other questions raised during the January 19-20 (Gregorian calendar) talks, such as Cossack officers’ pay and excise duties on rent, were not only superfluous but also created quite objectionable precedents for Ukrainian politics.

To correct the mistakes and drawbacks, the hetman headed for his Chyhyryn residency without even waiting for the Muscovite delegation to leave Pereyaslav. It is at Chyhyryn and later at Korsun in the first half of February 1654 that Khmelnytsky conducted a series of meetings with his senior officers, which focused on drawing up a treaty with the tsar and setting the required pace of international relations between Ukraine and Muscovy. But did the Hetmanate’s foreign policy pivot on the Moscow axis alone at the time?

How many allies or protectors does one need to feel well defended?

On February 11-12 or so, Polish King Jan II Kazimierz learned that Zaporozhzhian Sich had placed itself under the Muscovite tsar’s protection. Aware of an inevitable war in the East, the king launched an active diplomatic war against the tsar and the Ukrainian hetman. In the second half of February, Polish diplomats set off to Turkey, the Crimea, Wallachia, Transylvania, and Moldova to warn their rulers about the impending danger of the Cossack- Muscovite alliance and propose a joint action against it. This was also the time when Jan II Kazimierz sent his well-known message to the Cossack Colonel Ivan Bohun who refused to swear allegiance to Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich and thus raised Polish hopes of turning him to their side. Bohun was promised the hetman’s mace, confirmation of his noble status. and all kinds of other privileges at his wish if only he forsook the “traitor Khmelnytsky.”

While the Polish leadership had very slim chances in the game with Bohun, Warsaw’s foreign policy actions presented a great potential threat to Ukraine’s interests. For this reason the hetman’s government made strenuous foreign policy efforts to offset the negative impression the Pereyaslav accords made in Europe.

Despite a painful personal blow — the death of his son Tymosh in the summer of 1653 in the war against the Danubian princes — the need to defend national interests forced Bohdan to overcome his personal emotions and injustices by trying to make alliances with the prince of Transylvania and the hospodars of Moldova and Wallachia. Particularly, Khmelnytsky noted in his letter to Transylvanian Prince Gyorgy II Rakoczi that his “...son defended his father without my knowledge and sought an enemy wherever he went. But what was done cannot be undone...” He suggested restoring “the closest possible friendship” and asked the prince not to render “assistance to our foes.” Still more far-reaching were proposals to the Orthodox rulers of Moldova and Wallachia whom the hetman urged to maintain “good relations the way they originally were between us, Christian princes belonging to the same holy Orthodox church.”

Yet, the most important goal of the then Ukrainian foreign policy was undoubtedly to prevent the Crimean Khanate breaking away in the wake of the Moscow accords. For neither Bohdan nor his entourage viewed the alliance with the tsar as an alternative to friendship with the khan. This myth became deep-seated in the public mind when the Crimea was conquered by Catherine II, because it was extremely necessary to impart legitimacy to the incorporation of the peninsula. In reality, although relations between the Ukrainian Cossacks and the Crimean Tatars were indeed full of many confrontations, reducing them to this kind of interpretation would mean discoloring the rich historical palette. In the mid-1650s, the Crimean nobility included quite a powerful pro-Ukrainian party, so Bohdan tried to use its influence in order, if not to preserve the alliance with the Crimea against Poland, then at least to dissuade the khanate from taking an anti-Ukrainian stand and encourage its neutrality. To sound out the mood of Khan Islam Gerei’s court, the hetman sent envoys to Bakhchysarai in early February. When Bohdan learned that the news of the Ukrainian-Russian rapprochement had caused alarm in the khan’s residence, he sent another delegation to the Crimea at the end of February.

Simultaneously, relations with the Turkish sultan also developed in their own way. At first, Ukrainian diplomacy tried to avoid discussing the problem of the tsarist protectorate, attempting to make Istanbul exert influence on the Crimean leadership which was, as we know, a vassal of the sultan. When the Ukrainian envoys failed to do so, they repeated to Mehmed IV Khmelnytsky’s proposal to place Ukraine under the sultan’s protectorate(!). And it should be noted that there was nothing surprising or treacherous in the Ukrainian hetman’s actions, for the client-patron relationship calls on the client only to meet certain conditions in return for the services done or protection offered by the patron. In early 1654, the hetman and his top lieutenants did not discuss the annexation of Ukrainian lands by the Russian state. What kind of relations did they actually plan to establish with the Muscovite tsar?

The Ukrainian draft of February 17 (27), 1654.

In the middle of February, the hetman held a number of meetings with senior Cossacks, first in Chyhyryn and then in Korsun, to debate on the nature and content of the treaty between Zaporizhian Sich and the Muscovite tsar.

Although there is no first-hand information about the course of those meetings, the available indirect evidence allowed Mykhailo Hrushevsky to conclude that there was quite a heated debate and that both sides were adamant. This hindered to some extent drawing up a conceptually consistent agreement. What actually caused the senior officers to pursue different interests was the fact that they, like all came from the Orthodox nobility as well as the “old” Cossacks, peasants, and town dwellers. Naturally, this lack of social uniformity told both on the level of the political culture of various Cossack branches and on their urgent priorities. The point is that for some of them it was important that the Hetmanate achieve a high degree of political independence (they, as nobles, already enjoyed other rights), while others did not want to be forced to work for the landlord or tsar.

Finally, the drafters of the agreement managed to balance the interests of diverse social strata and work out a document that guaranteed observance of the nation’s rights on the international arena and inviolability of the country’s political, administrative, and socioeconomic systems, as well as guarantees for certain social strata and groups and even certain ranks of Ukrainian administrators.

The draft contained 23 articles in all. The most important of them proclaimed the idea of the Hetmanate’s independence, which in turn meant free election of the hetman as the head of state and government and the commander-inchief of the Ukrainian army. In addition, the Cossack Ukraine was to retain the right to maintain diplomatic relations with foreign states (the hetman’s government made a commitment to pass along to Moscow any information touching upon the tsar’s interests). A separate clause guaranteed the inviolability of the Sich’s domestic order, the rights and privileges of the Ukrainian population as a whole and of its individual social estates and groups.

The Russian side was obligated to offer military aid in case of a war against Poland and to help keep the Crimean Khanate from entering into any such war. In return, the hetman’s government recognized the tsar as its suzerain and pledged to pay him a prearranged fixed annual tribute, as the rulers of Transylvania, Moldova, and Wallachia did to the Turkish sultan.

In addition to these crucial points, the draft also contained a number of minor provisions borrowed from the text of the 1649 Zboriv agreement between the Cossacks and the Polish king. Given the entirely new nature of the Hetmanate’s relations with the tsar, these provisions were absolutely out of place and can only be viewed as rudiments of the Cossack policy of autonomy which Khmelnytsky and his lieutenants had dropped much earlier in favor of one designed to achieve Ukraine’s independence.

Still, despite some drawbacks, the draft leaves a generally good impression and, if fully implemented by Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich’s government, could have laid a the foundation for mutually advantageous and sound relations between both sides.

On February 17 (27), 1654, Hetman Khmelnytsky endorsed the Ukrainian draft, and a delegation led by Justice General Samiylo Bohdanovych-Zarudny and Pereyaslav Colonel Pavlo Teteria conveyed it to Moscow. And, while the proclamation of alliance in Pereyaslav was in fact a formality, the Ukrainian-Russian treaty, expected to be concluded in the wake of the Moscow talks, was of paramount importance for the destiny of the Ukrainian state.

(To be continued)