Intentions that can bring Ukraine back to August 2008

Russia’s intention to deploy a naval task force in the Mediterranean is getting increasingly acute for Ukraine. RF Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu previously mentioned five to six various warships; that the task force would mainly include frigates, cruisers, and support ships (see The Day’s “Russian fleet returns to Mediterranean,” March 14, 2013). Admiral Viktor Chirkov, Commander of the Russian Navy, said in a recent interview with the Zvezda Channel that the “squadron” would be under the command of the Black Sea Fleet at Sevastopol. In other words, it would receive orders from Ukrainian territory. Has this been agreed upon with the Ukrainian side?

The Soviet fleet operated in the Mediterranean in 1967-92 when the Fifth Soviet Mediterranean Squadron, made up of 30-50 warships, faced the Sixth US Fleet. Russia’s current ambitions are considerably more modest. Russia is reported to be planning to renew its permanent presence in the Mediterranean by 2015. Naturally, the Russian Ministry of Defense will have to spend the next couple of years upgrading the Black Sea Fleet (counter to the Russia-Ukraine accords) and establish a system of logistics in the Mediterranean. This will call for services on the part of Ukraine and the naval base at Sevastopol.

From what Admiral Chirkov had to say, Russia’s militaristic aspirations are clearly mounting. Task forces would be deployed also in the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific, if need be (no such necessity at the moment). Decisions would be made depending on the situation: “The history of the Soviet Navy knows of periods when we had squadrons deployed in the Indian Ocean and in the Pacific. Naturally, in case of necessity we will suggest to the Ministry of Defense and the President that task forces be deployed there on a permanent basis.”

The Day asked experts for comment on the Russian naval commander’s statement about the Mediterranean task force being commanded from Ukrainian territory, and on political consequences for Ukraine.

By Mykola SEMENA, The Day, Sevastopol

COMMENTARIES

Myroslav MAMCHAK, Captain 1st Rank, Ukrainian Navy (Reserve):

“These intentions of Russia can actually bring Ukraine back to what happened in August 2008 when Russia was invading Georgia, using the Sevastopol naval base, contrary to the general Black Sea Fleet deployment agreement. Although using terms such as ‘squadron’ or ‘combat group’ in the Mediterranean is an overstatement (because Russia simply cannot afford to deploy a squadron and the whole affair boils down to a show-the-flag maneuver), the political consequences could be quite serious. Of course, the situation could change by 2015. The fact remains that the Russian naval commander made this statement as though a final decision had been made. Not a word about the need to coordinate this stand with the Ukrainian side. Ukraine as a host country can have its own opinion on the matter.

“The Russian naval commander must be aware of Ukraine’s neutral status. Even if one disregards the fact that the deployment in Ukraine of a fleet of one of the warring countries nullifies this neutral status, Russia’s repeated attempts to use Ukrainian territory for military purposes shows that either the Ukrainian government does not know what being non-bloc is all about, or that it is being disingenuous toward the international community. This task force will be made up of ships from the Black Sea and other Russian fleets. We have agreements on the Black Sea ships but none on other ships and their being commanded or supplied from Ukrainian territory.

“Another important aspect is that the Russian naval commander admitted that his statement was made two to three years before the Russian warships would sail to the Mediterranean. This is illogical for the military, considering that preparations for such a mission ought to have been kept secret until H-hour. However, there is nothing surprising about this statement being made when it was. That was another way to demonstrate Ukraine’s involvement in a military and political alliance with Russia and thus to frustrate the association agreement with the European Union. That was another attempt to call into question the sincerity of Ukraine’s aspirations for the European values. Apparently, the periodic presence of a number of Russian warships in the Mediterranean (periodic because I don’t think that permanent presence will ever be achieved) is of little military strategic importance. It is just a show-the-flag venture. At the same time, it can have serious military and political consequences for Ukraine as a neutral country. It can disrupt Ukraine’s international plans. Russia has once again demonstrated to the international community that it is not a friendly partner but rival of Ukraine; that it wants to worsen Ukraine’s international position. All this is further proof that the renewal of the Black Sea Fleet deployment agreement in Kharkiv (a) is not being accompanied by any lowering of gas prices (and these prices are the highest in the history [of independent Ukraine]), and (b) that it was a strategic military and political mistake that has inflicted a heavy economic, strategic, military and political damage on Ukraine.”

Serhii KULYK, director, Nomos Analytical Center:

“I think that the deployment of the Russian task force in the Mediterranean will produce no negative consequences for Ukraine. First, there will be no forceful action, so the whole thing doesn’t contradict the [Black Sea Fleet] deployment agreement. Second, Black Sea Fleet ships leaving the Sevastopol naval base, headed for various seas and oceans, always receive orders from Sevastopol with its communications facilities. Therefore, the deployment of Russian warships in the Mediterranean will be nothing out of the ordinary, nothing new. This act will be a sequel to Russia’s military and political strategy, so there will be nothing new in the relations with Ukraine or the international community.”

Admiral Ihor TENIUKH, Commander of the Ukrainian Navy (2006-10):

“This is a very complicated issue. First, how is one to understand ‘bodies of control’? If the ships – the task force of 5-7 vessels – are controlled from Sevastopol, as stated by the naval commander of the Russian Federation, and if a special headquarters is set up to supervise that task force (I believe this will be the case), then this will be a violation [of the deployment agreement]. If they bring materiel from the Russian Federation and assign officers from other Russian fleets, this will be another violation, considering that officers from other fleets can be on Ukrainian territory only on business trips lasting for up to three months and must then leave Ukraine. Of course, they [Russia’s naval command. – Ed.] can send away and receive staff officers. No violation here. The main thing is the format of this command.

“Another important thing is that this task force will include Black Sea Fleet ships that will be assigned combat missions. Serving on such a mission means carrying out combat tasks in peacetime. Ukraine will be asked questions depending on the kind of missions they will carry out in the Mediterranean, and if weapons are fired, because these ships came from its territorial waters and because the agreement between Ukraine and Russia does not provide for this. Until now Kyiv and Moscow have been trying to negotiate an agreement on the use of Black Sea Fleet vessels in time of crisis. This agreement must have clear-cut clauses on the ships’ actions in time of crisis on Ukrainian territory. This is the stumbling block in the exact formulation of the Mediterranean task force’s actions in terms of consequences for Ukraine.

“Georgia offered an interesting example when Black Sea Fleet ships were assigned missions other than those envisaged by the Ukraine-Russia agreement. They returned to Ukraine. The problem is that Ukraine may find itself accused of being involved in actions that may take place [without its knowledge and consent].”

Interviewed by Ihor SAMOKYSH, The Day