The Washington Post launches strategic debate aimed at answering the question “What to do with Russia?”

Foreign publications and analysts are paying great attention to the Ukrainian situation. This is not surprising, because the Russian aggression in the Donbas is listed among the three greatest threats facing the world. Typically for this debate, most Western analysts offer their versions of what Ukraine has to do in this situation that add up to action plans for “making Ukraine a viable independent state.” However, there are some voices who believe that this situation calls for a strategic debate aimed at answering the question “What to do with Russia?”

Daniel Drezner, professor of international politics at Tufts University, raised this issue in his article in The Washington Post, entitled “How the West should respond to Putin.” The author believes that in addition to sanctions, the West may resort to strategic steps that can cope with Vladimir Putin’s unique challenge:

“So… if I was advising President Obama, here are the steps I’d be taking to handle a threat from Putin that doesn’t look like it’s going to subside anytime soon:

1.      Create a pathway for Sweden and Finland to join NATO. Putin needs a Security Dilemma 101 class right damn now, which means he needs to know that offensive actions will trigger balancing coalitions. Finland and Sweden are the two most significant countries in Europe not in NATO. Over the past year, these Scandinavian countries have taken steps toward closer NATO ties. At a minimum, form an exploratory committee with them to see what NATO membership would entail.

2.      Finish negotiating TTIP. As I said earlier this week, the real existential threat to Putin is the economic appeal of the West. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership will increase that allure – not to mention provided a much-needed boost to euro zone economies.

3.      Start building CoCom II. The economic companion to NATO during the Cold War was the Coordinating Committee that imposed a strategic embargo on the Soviet Union. To be clear, I don’t think we’re quite at Cold War II territory yet. That said, setting up a CoCom-like structure to manage the current sanctions – as well as potential future sanctions – does signal to Russian plutocrats that without some serious changes in Russian behavior, Western economic pressure is not going away. Furthermore, this CoCom could also be used to handle other tasks, such as coordinating against Russian cyberattacks.

4.      Pay attention to Moldova. Maybe it’s time to start thinking about where else in Europe Putin can make mischief. His softest target is Moldova, a small, weak country that already has a Russian irredentist problem. So start bolstering Moldovan capabilities before a problem arises.

5.      Play the long game of a frozen conflict in Ukraine. Yes, Ukraine is very important to Putin, and yes, Russia will be ready to inject more men treasure into the conflict to get its way. You know what, though? The West has a hell of a lot more resources than Russia. So beyond the IMF deal, take the necessary steps to ensure that Ukraine is on the right economic and political path. It is likely that Putin will counter with more efforts to subvert the Ukrainian state. But this is one dimension of statecraft where the West has an advantage. So press it.”

COMMENTARY

Mykola KAPITONENKO, executive director, Center for International Relations Research, Kyiv:

“Drezner’s recipe offers a kind of maximum program which assumes full participation of the US in Europe’s security system, which many Americans wanted to avoid after the Cold War ended. President Barack Obama is a poor target for this kind of advice. A Republican administration would fit such plans much better.

“This set of measures is based on the good old time-tested recipes, which enabled the US to win the Cold War. Simultaneous creation of threats in the politico-military and economic fields, containing the Kremlin in regional conflicts and ideological competition – the West has an overwhelming advantage in all these areas.

“The only problem is that President Obama has not been eager to implement it, believing, apparently, that bringing Russia to its senses through limited measures would serve the long-term interests of the US better. After all, if the Soviet Union was an alternative pole of power, threatening the vital interests of the United States, contemporary Russia is just a regional power, nothing more. Apparently, the American president believes that the use of power must be proportionate to emerging threats.

“Returning to Drezner’s proposed strategy, all these steps, except the first, will be implemented as soon as the US decides that Russia is worthy of confrontation and full-fledged containment. The question of NATO membership for Sweden and Finland is up to these two states. I see the abolition of existing unwritten restrictions on NATO membership for countries with ‘frozen conflicts’ on their soil as a much more promising way to create a deterrent coalition. NATO should send a signal to the Kremlin that the artificial creation and maintenance of conflicts will no longer put a brake in the way of Ukraine’s, Georgia’s, and Moldova’s membership in the alliance.

“Moreover, all these states should be part of a long-term and coherent Western strategy toward Russia. The Kremlin has tried to impose a new reality on Europe, making it much more ‘realistic’ and distrustful. This is Putin’s greatest blunder, perhaps, because Russia has no hope to win a full-on confrontation with the West.”