What can we expect from the National Bureau of Investigation?
Before setting up the National Bureau of Investigation (Ukr. abbr., NBR) we have to make clear precisely what we expect from it. If it proves to be yet another law enforcement agency, we won’t receive the results we want, just more problems. There are too many structures in Ukraine that are legally entitled to combat organized crime using clandestine techniques and tactics. Under the Soviets they were considerably fewer in number. Today we have an advanced legal framework in this particular field of endeavor. Ukraine is a member of Interpol, it has bilateral cooperation agreements with Russia, the United States, and many other countries, aimed at combating all kinds of crimes. This involves the SBU [the secret police of Ukraine], Interior Ministry (MVS), Prosecutor General’s Office, customs, border checkpoint, financial, tax-collecting, and other authorities.
Today, a great deal of the activities of Ukraine’s three intelligence services are aimed at combating organized crime on an international scope, with terrorism, drug trafficking, and money laundering topping the list. In addition, the SBU, MVS, and Defense Ministry (Minoborony) have Spetsnaz [SWAT] units that can carry out most complicated missions, on any scale, in combating organized crime. Their personnel and logistics need nothing other than upgrading.
We recently also had the Coordinating Committee against Organized Crime. There is also pertinent committee in parliament and several parliamentary committees of inquiry.
Proceeding from what is stated above, the problem of stepping up struggle against the gravest crimes is not the absence of a structure (we have enough and to spare). It is something altogether different.
In my opinion, before we decide on setting up the NBR, we must resolve two key problems: (a) the jurisdiction of this new structure and (b) its field of endeavor. There are other problems, but they are of minor importance in making the decision.
Jurisdiction and field of endeavor mean that the new structure will be entitled to conduct investigation anywhere, using all modern techniques, whether it concerns the cabinet, parliament, even president, let alone the MVS, SBU, Tax Administration, customs authorities or regional (oblast) state administrations. Will the NBR be entitled to have undercover agents in all structures of the state and keep them safe as the case may be? Who will monitor the legitimacy of this organization, considering that the Prosecutor General’s post has become obviously politicized over the couple of past years. Will this post go to a special prosecutor elected by parliament for a term of seven years, like the head of the Accounting Chamber? He will have access to mind-boggling top-secret documents. Will they use another technology?
Will the NRB conduct criminal investigations? If so, the old problem of the expediency of investigation at the Prosecutor General’s Office presents itself. Will we have to return to the subject of a single investigation committee which so loathed by the chiefs of law enforcement agencies? Such “close collaboration” between field and investigating officers within a single agency, working under the same chief, turns out effective only when solving comparatively simple cases, but it goes to pieces during court hearings that deal with complicated cases. Will the NRB be authorized to listen in on telephone conversations, monitor e-mail messages, carry out secret searches of apartments and homes, in accordance with the Law on Undercover Operations (ORD)? Or will this remain the SBU’s responsibility, if and when required by the NBR? These are very different things in terms of undercover security and its economy.
Will the NBR have the right to access databases of other law enforcement agencies? Or maybe someone else will be in a position to authorize such access? This is a highly sensitive aspect: unless well thought out, it can result in a counterproductive competition between the law enforcement agencies.
Will the NBR have its offices in the oblasts or just special offices in the problem regions? How will it coordinate its activities with the local law enforcement authorities? Maybe there will be none at first? Will there be any subordination to local authorities - like when getting apartments, cars, resort accommodations, logistics, organizing the infrastructure?
These are far from all the points that should be on the NBR agenda before it is actually created. Most of the answers to these questions are found in the political field where everything is decided by the head of state, President Viktor Yushchenko of Ukraine (he is supposed to be in command of the NBR). Naturally, our president can’t cope with the NBR’s daily matters, so there must be a go-between to supervise its work. Here, too, a number of complicated issues present themselves, apart from that of competition.
Of course, the NBR must not become another “sword of the revolution” [as was the NKVD/KGB motto]. Therefore someone must be appointed to supervise its work: the Speaker of our Parliament and the head of the Accounting Chamber of Ukraine. Both will hear the NBR progress reports, together with the head of state, once a month or otherwise. No one else will be in a position to demand information from the NBR, except for separate cases determined by our president when NVR activities can be discussed by closed sittings of the National Security and Defense Council (RNBO) of Ukraine.
In this context it is very important to cope with the so-called initial accumulation of capital and earning “the first million dollars.” Will the NRB handle these matters? Will it have an pardon of sorts? We all know how Ukrainian “big business” was formed and how the current legal framework applies to it, what with the passions of current power play. This can result in an orgy of political revenge. This is a very complicated political problem that can and must be solved. This is especially important, considering that the NRB bill is at the Verkhovna Rada. Quite a few of the current and firmer parliamentarians have the above-mentioned problems.
It is also important to think twice before naming the NBR: National Bureau of Investigation. It must not be like the FBI... we must find a title for it while keeping in mind the above-mentioned problems. We must also bear in mind the fact that this structure will employ top-notch professionals, so staffing it will be another highly complicated problem. True professionals hate being ordered to keep clear of certain citizens for they can have more information to share in the course of investigation than someone “upstairs” may want to hear - this number includes MPs, their relatives, people who have property far in excess of their official wages. In other words, NRB investigators will be exposed to temptations, what with election and other political campaigns.
