Top secret Russian archives with “Ukrainian specifics”

The Russian Federation has announced the opening of a powerful historical Internet resource on the Soviet era. It was decided to focus on the Stalin times, posting all the Politburo documents dated 1919-32 (almost half a million copies) and Joseph Stalin’s personal materials, including his correspondence. “It is no mere chance that specialists decided to make public Stalin-era documents, for this historical period, as well as the personality of the leader himself, are today in the spotlight of not only Russian, but also worldwide historiography,” said Andrei Sorokin, director of the Russian State Archive of Sociopolitical History, in an interview to ITAR-TASS.

Historical problems, especially those of the recent Soviet Stalinist past, are a sore point, particularly if we try to find the truth about Ukraine-Russia relations. According to Candidate of Sciences (History) Liudmyla HRYNEVYCH, archives hide “a whole world of documents,” so it is very difficult to use concrete figures. “Naturally, many documents have been made public now, but the ones that deal with “Ukrainian specifics” still remain classified,” she argues. In an interview with Ms. Hrynevych and the Russian academic, Doctor of Sciences (Philosophy) Igor CHUBAIS, The Day tried to find out whether the archives might become just another attempt to manipulate the Russian as well as the worldwide expert community.

Ms. Hrynevych, is Russia’s declassification of Soviet-era archives going to make it easier for Ukrainian academics to get access to documents?

“Access to archival documents online is always a positive thing. On the other hand, online documents will only be really valuable if all of them, rather than a selected few, have been posted on the website. I can see now that some of the Stalin-collection documents have been excluded from publication. It is, of course, also good, but researchers will immediately raise questions about the criteria of selection. In particular, the website still lacks materials from List 11 of this collection, while this very list contains a lot of important documents that shed light on what we can call ‘the Ukrainian specifics of Stalin’s revolution from above.’

“As a matter of fact, unaware of the subtleties of research, the public often naively accepts the collections of documents published or posted on websites as the ultimate truth, forgetting that the documents were selected by a certain researcher or a research organization. So you can only rate the value of a documental collection if you are convinced in a sufficient professional level and political impartiality of the editors. The same applies to online archives. We can see that the new website was set up by the Federal Archive Agency, so there is no doubt about the editors’ professional capabilities. Yet there still remains the question of political influences. Unfortunately, there are grounds to claim this. I will remind you a story that occurred a few years ago – it was widely commented upon in the press and there was even an interpellation in this connection. I mean the preparation of a collection of documents, Famine in the USSR. It was prepared on the instructions of Dr. Viktor Kondrashin who in fact openly suggested that documents on the ‘Ukrainian specifics’ of Stalin’s policy be avoided in the selection of archival materials. It is a scandal, for it is quite clear that this kind of selection may result not in informing but in misinforming the public for certain political reasons.”

So, it is too early to say that Russia is taking a step forward to admit Stalinist crimes?

“You know, Vladimir Lenin once wrote a work eloquently titled One Step Forward, Two Steps Back. I will say it again and emphasize that publication of all the documents will undoubtedly be a step forward, but if it is selective, this will be one step forward and two steps back, for there always be a question of whether some documents have been hidden deliberately or undeliberately.

“Let me give you quite a concrete example of this. Russia once carried out a large-scale project of publishing a collection of documents, Tragedy of the Soviet Countryside: Collectivization and Dispossession of Kulaks. 1927-1933. The collection is, of course, valuable, but… The editor obviously failed to avoid, deliberately or undeliberately, the suppression of the problems that are extremely important for Ukraine. It is about a huge array of documents about a tragic situation in Ukraine in 1927/28-1928/29. At the time, grain was exported and taken to other Soviet republics, mostly to the central industrial region of Russia, from Ukraine that was partially hit by a crop failure, which was one of the causes of a famine that claimed hundreds of thousands of human lives and was in fact the first step towards pushing Ukraine into the abyss of the Holodomor.

“Although a central and a Ukrainian commission functioned during the 1928-29 famine and there is an ocean of documents on those events, the abovementioned collection does not in fact comprise them. Why? Is this perhaps due to the fact that this famine was caused by a specific Soviet famine-making policy which also included imposing on Ukraine the unbearable role of a donor for fast-developing Northern industrial regions?

“Let us turn now to materials on the Stalin collection website. As I have said above, the site still lacks the List 11 documents. But this collection has, for example, File 36 with Stalin’s correspondence (telegrams and letters) from which it is crystal clear that, in the conditions of a partial crop failure and famine in 1928, “Ukraine is the main supplier of grain to Moscow, Leningrad, and major industrial center.” Or take File 38 which amply shows that in 1930 the Ukrainian top authorities were given clear-cut instructions about how to organize the trial of Serhii Yefremov. Or File 45 which includes materials for 1933 with such passages as “It has come to the attention of the VKP(b) Central Committee and the USSR Council of People’s Commissars that peasants are leaving Kuban and Ukraine on a mass scale for the Central Black Earth Region, the Volga, Moscow oblast, Western oblast, and Belorussia ‘in search of bread.’” This is followed by instructions, such as “ban, forbid,” etc.

“These documents have not yet been posted on the website, but let us hope that all the Stalin collection documents will be fully presented in the near future. We’ll wait and see.

“Incidentally, not only we, academics, but also the public would like to see Stalin-era documents published on a regular, not a selective, basis. This also applies to the Russian public which should gradually free themselves from the Stalinist past. Undoubtedly, our society needs the same, for the Ukrainian SSR was also part of the USSR and Stalin’s crimes are also our past and our pain.”

As is known, the recently approved national concept of teaching history in Russian schools characterizes the Stalin period as “establishment of one-party dictatorship and one-man rule” – not a single word about repressions. To what extent integrative is Russia’s humanitarian policy?

“It is worthwhile to recall that the USSR’s official policy in the humanitarian sphere was based on hiding and hushing up ‘the negative’ and advocating, as much as possible, ‘the positive.’ If we look at certain periods of history, such as the interwar span or World War II, we will see that emphasis was always put on positive things (grandiose five-year plan projects, mass-scale enthusiasm and heroism, victories, etc.).

“The communist concept presupposed that the new generation of Soviet people must be educated on victories and other positive things only, while it was better to turn a blind eye to negative ‘trifles.’ Among these ‘trifle’ were the Holodomor – an act of genocide, a wide-scale humanitarian disaster to which millions of people fell victim, – mass-scale repressions against innocent people, and almost all the ‘shady’ pages of the past war.

“When the Soviet Union ceased to exist, the now independent states, including Ukraine, began to shape a new humanitarian policy. Accordingly, academics and the public began to actively spotlight the previously hushed-up negative points. But, unfortunately, the ‘positive’ concept never gave way – on the national level – to the concept of an impartial treatment of both ‘positives’ and ‘negatives.’ And the current Russian policy is, in my view, clearly leaning to the Soviet concept of the past, which emphasizes positive points. It is through this prism that present-day Russia interprets the World War II subject. Naturally, there was heroism and numerous manifestations of humanity in the inhuman conditions during the war, but there were also millions of those killed, there were Soviet war crimes, including those committed by the Red Army in Europe, there were mass-scale rapes of women in the liberated countries, there was terror, in fact genocide, in Western Ukraine, and there was the ever-increasing grip of the Stalinist regime on Eastern Europe. Appealing only to positive things is a step that will bring back the Soviet interpretation of the historical past.

“Unfortunately, a similar picture can sometimes be seen in modern-day Ukraine, too. Some representatives of the ruling party, who, for some reason, consider themselves prominent experts in the humanitarian sphere, can be often heard saying that the younger generation should be educated on the examples of victories and other positive things. We can also hear calls to stop talking about the famine and repressions and ‘dancing on human bones.’ This is wrong. A full-fledged national and historical policy should be shaped on the presumption that the public, particularly youth, should know the entire truth about the difficult pages of the historical past as well as about what was positive. There should be no pendulum here. But if we keep hushing up the horrible pages of the communist past to which dozens of millions of people fell victim, we will never shake off the Soviet burden and will continue to rummage and live in it, breathe it, no matter how much we speak of freedom and democracy.”

Can this result in a sort of ambivalence: the concept “Stalin is a great leader” will remain in mass awareness, while the whole truth will be accessible just to a narrow circle of researchers that can use archives?

“Indeed, the opening of archives will in itself produce nothing, no matter what valuable information they contain, if the governmental humanitarian policy is not aimed at popularizing these documents. Archival materials are of paramount importance, but it is right that they arouse the interest of, above all, researchers. And even if a researcher is doing concrete work, defends a Ph.D. or a higher-doctorate dissertation, or writes a nice monograph and posts it on the Internet, this does not yet mean that his or her scholarly achievement will be part of common knowledge. It is the state that is supposed to promote this, pursue a proper educational policy, and popularize new information by funding certain radio and television programs, etc. Interest in scholarly knowledge is stirred up, to a considerable extent, by the state’s political will and financial resources. Naturally, if there are websites that provide access to important archival documents, while the governmental policy is based on either ‘the positive’ or ‘the negative’ alone, ambivalence will be inevitable.”

“This does not mean at all that they want to put an end to Stalinism,”

historian Igor CHUBAIS, a professor at the Moscow Economic Institute, told The Day

“This is an important and right, albeit very much belated, step. This country has been fighting against Stalinism and Leninism since 1917, the very beginning of the Civil War. Russia did not accept the Bolshevik obscurantism. The year 1991 saw the fall of the communist state itself, but there has not yet been even a single appraisal of Stalin’s and Lenin’s misrule. What the government is pursuing today may be called ‘hodge-podge policy.’ In our country, Stalin is simultaneously the face of victory in the war and the one who got Polish officers shot in Katyn. It is not a mere coincidence but a deliberate and purposeful policy because (as far as I know) it is planned to put up a monument to the victims of political repressions at the governmental expense in two years’ time. But this does not mean at all that they want to put an end to Stalinism. They are trying to unite the absolutely ununitable. It is sort of a valve through which the steam is being let off but further conclusions are not being made.

“In Russia, nobody resists the glorification of Stalin. For example, the city of Volgograd was renamed Stalingrad for a week to mark the anniversary of the Volga battle. At the same time, an archive is being opened, from which one can learn very much [about Stalin’s misdeeds. – Ed.]. Many things are becoming clear from the now existing documents. However, our official social science is totally fruitless. I think the researchers that deal with non-systemic social sciences need to be united because the official academe will never condemn Stalin.”

Can the opening of the archive prompt society to make a certain appraisal of Stalin?

“The government’s official policy is that the dispute about Stalin is useful, should go on, and, what is more, never come to a halt. It is impossible to make conclusions about Stalin’s misrule – there can only be a debate. And the authorities are encouraging this: ‘Go on arguing, and we will publish more documents…’ It is impossible to condemn this obscurantist and murderer today.”

Why do you think it is so important for the government to continue this debate?

“This dispute is needed because the current policy and ideology is directly opposite to communism, and, as is known, extremes meet. In the Soviet Union, there was an unambiguous answer to all questions, and a step aside was tantamount to an escape. But this ideology went bust, and the current authorities do not want to be held accountable for anything. For once they have chosen a clear benchmark and goal, they will have to achieve this goal and be responsible for this. This is why the Kremlin has quite deliberately refused to form a goal. Our policy is pro-Western and anti-Western, pro-Russian and anti-Russian, pro-Soviet and anti-Soviet at the same time. Responsibility disappears in this situation. The Russian government refuses to form a specific identity, idea, and goal. It cannot be held accountable because it has promised nothing.”

Do you agree that refusing to form an identity and responsibility slows down the evolution of Russian society?

“This policy is not just slowing down the country’s progress but it makes it impossible. It is ruining the country. A revolution needs several factors, such as a split in the elites, high public activism, and a crisis of official goals and ideology. All this already exists, and we are in a state of not just a crisis but a post-crisis. Everything has already burned out, decayed, and is causing an allergy.”

By Ihor SAMOKYSH, The Day